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Notes
THE DOCTRINE OF PART PERFORMANCE
AND
CONTRACTS TO DEVISE IN KENTUCKY
Miller v. Miller,' a 1960 Kentucky case, may have a profound effect
upon Kentucky law. A mother, as guardian of her illegitimate child,
brought an action to enforce an oral promise by the deceased father
to will certain real and personal property to their child in consideration
of the mother's forbearance from bringing bastardy proceedings.
The action was brought against the heirs, who still retained the
property, and the administrator; the complaint alternatively demanded
specific performance or $55,000 damages. The testimony as to the value
of the land given by the heirs' witnesses varied from $12,000 to $15,000,
but that given by the plaintiff's witnesses varied from $46,000 to
$60,000. Comparable property had recently sold for $28,500. The
chancellor found the proof of the contract to be "clear and convincing"
and entered a judgment against the administrator for $32,750 as the
fair market value of the property. The complaint was dismissed as to
the heirs.
Even though the judgment was technically in their favor, the heirs
were allowed to appeal; they contended that the established value was
erroneous. The Court of Appeals reversed as to the measure and mode
of recovery. The court affirmed the trial court's holding that the
promisee of an oral contract to devise reality who has completed his
performance, which cannot be computed pecuniarily, is entitled to a
judgment for the value of the realty; but it reversed on the sole ground
that in such a case where the realty is available for transfer and where
its value cannot be determined except from conflicting testimony, the
court should order the transfer of the property rather than a monetary
recovery.
INThODUCTION
The Court of Appeals has impliedly recognized the doctrine of
part performance as a means of further circumventing the Statute of
Frauds.2 The purpose of this note is to demonstrate why the Miller
decision may serve as the springboard for the general adoption of the
doctrine of part performance, especially as to the commercial oral
1335 S.W.2d 884 (Ky. 1960).2 Ky. Rev. Stat. § 371.010(6) (1960) [Hereinafter cited as KIS].
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contract for the sale of realty. This purpose is developed in the con-
clusion of this note which follows a discussion of necessary background
material. First, there will be an explanation of the general nature of
contracts to devise, and of the remedies available to the surviving
promisee or third-party beneficiary (who was to be made devisee).
Second, there will be a discussion of Kentucky's former unique manner
of granting relief and its rationale-a refusal to recognize the part
performance doctrine. Third is a discussion of the Miller opinion
which abandoned this unique position.
I. CoNTRAcArs TO DEmSE REALTY
A. Areas of Use
The contract to devise 3 realty or an entire estate is one of the
layman's favorite estate-planning tools4 and naturally so since it
appears to be the best solution to several personal problems. To an
elderly person of limited wealth it provides the best assurance of
dependable personal care and adequate livelihood until death while
avoiding the setting up of a trust or the sale of his property.5 The
latter two means are not only instinctively undesirable, but may prove
vastly inadequate financially. To impoverished parents the contract
to devise is often the most practical and desirable means of providing
for a child, for in consideration of relinquishing the custody, love, and
affection of the child, they may procure the promise of a childless or
philanthropic individual to provide for the child by will, or to adopt
or to make him an heir.6 To the unwed mother and putative father
such a contract is more desirable than public bastardy proceedings.
B. Sources of Confusion
1. Contract and Will Complications. The validity of the written
contract to devise is now without question,7 but the application of this
8 In this note, devise" will be used only in conjunction with realty and
"bequeath" only with personalty even though both terms are often used in
reference to either type of property or to a combination of both. Even if only a
small part of an estate which is to be devised is realty, "devised" will be used.
4 See Sparks, Contract to Devise or Bequeath as an Estate Planning Device,
20 Mo. L. Rev. 1 (1955). This statement is further supported by the large
volume of reported cases concerning this device. See American Digest System,
Wills, Keys 58-68.
5 Gibson v. Crawford, 247 Ky. 228, 233, 56 S.W.2d 985, 987 (1982) stated:
"By far the greater number of cases [concerning contracts to devise] are dealing
with contracts or agreements to make a devise in consideration of services per-
formed or to be performed.. ." For numerous examples see Annots., 101 A.L.R.
923, 1097 (1936), 69 A.L.R. 14 (1930).
6 See Hirsch, Contracts to Devise and Bequeath, 9 Wis. L. Rev. 267, 269
(1934).
7 1 Page, Wills § 10.1 (Bowe-Parker rev. 1960) [Hereinafter cited as Page].
However, doubt as to validity still exists in one area-contracts to surrender custody
(Footnote continued on next page)
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rule is confused" by other factors. This is due first to the "dual aspect"
of the device. Each aspect must be treated separately since "our law
has no separate concept of 'will made in pursuance of contract."' The
device need not comply with the Statute of Wills because it is treated
not as a will but as a contract; 10 yet, a will made pursuant to the
contract is as revocable as any other will.'1 Upon revocation of the
will the promisee may nevertheless obtain the same result by getting
a decree of specific performance on the ground that legal remedies are
clearly inadequate because of the immeasurability of his performance
and the fact that the contract concerned land and the final disposition
of a lifetimes accumulations. 12 This specific enforcement, however,
is subject to a widow's dower rights.13 Frequent contracts to make
joint wills, which may be held to be irrevocable, add to the com-
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
of a child in consideration of a promise to devise property to or make him an
heir. Hooks v. Bridgewater, 111 Tex. 122, -, 229 S.W. 1114, 1118 (1921),
said such contracts should be void as a matter of public policy, for their enforce-
ment would detract from parental duty and be detrimental to child welfare. See
Annot., 15 A.L.R. 223 (1921).
Davis v. Jones Adm'r, 94 Ky. 320, 22 S.W. 331 (1893), held that contracts
to make a child an heir are against public policy since they provide for irregular
devolution of property; the only way to make a child a legal heir is by com-
pliance with the adoption statute. However, where the promisor is the father, the
Court of Appeals has expressly denied the application of Davis because of the
bastardy statute, which compels the father to support ,his illegitimate child (KRS
ch. 406), the moral obligation of the father, and the welfare of the child. Hehr's
Adinr v. Hehr, 288 Ky. 580, 157 S.W.2d 111 (1941).
As to contracts to adopt a non-relative as an heir rather than to devise to
him, the Kentucky court has said: "An agreement by a person to make another,
not related to him, his heir, is against the policy of the common law, and [such
a person does not become his heir] where the procedure is prescribed by the
statute, authorizing the adoption of a legal heir, has not been followed." Carter
v. Capshaw, 249 Ky. 483, 489, 60 S.W.2d 959, 961-62 (1933). For cases sup-
porting the contra, and apparently the majority view, see Annots. 171 A L R
1315 (1947), 142 A.L.R. 84 (1943), 69 A.L.R. 14, 39-47 (1930), 27 A.L.E
1325 (1923).
However, the possibility that the Kentucky court would change its position
even after the Miller case is doubtful. See Higgason v. Henry, 313 S.W.2d 275
(Ky. 1958). Frequently these contracts are accompanied by covenants to provide
for the child by will or to make him an heir. Simply because of this combination,
such contracts have been enforced. See Annot., 27 A.L.R., op. cit. supra, at 1337.
8 Gibson v. Crawford, 247 Ky. 228, 233, 56 S.W.2d 985, 987 (1932), said:
"As a matter of first impression, it appears that there is a great conflict of authori-
ties dealing with the question of contracts to devise land."
9 Atkinson, Wills § 49 (2d ed. 1953).
10 1 Page § 10.3.
" Watkins v. Covington Trust & Banking Co., 303 Ky. 644, 198 S.W.2d 964
(1947). Contra, Johnston v. Tomme, 199 Miss. 337, 24 So.2d 730 (1946), com-
mented on in 18 Miss. L.J. 328 (1947).
12 Sparks, Contracts to Make Wills 146 (1956), and Part of this note.
'.3 Wides v. Wides' Ex'r, 299 Ky. 103, 184 S.W.2d 579 (1944); Whiteside
&Kostas, Recent Developments in the Kentucky Law of Wills-1949-1954, 42 Ky.
L.J. 671, 674 (1954).
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plexity14 as do contracts not to make wills.' 5 An instrument written to
be a will, but invalid as such, may be a valid contract,16 yet the con-
verse is scarcely conceivable due to the necessity of testamentary form.
An instrument may be both a contract and a will.1 7 Contracts to devise
are easily confused with agreements to compensate for personal services
generally or by will. The distinction is important because of the pre-
sumption of gratuity between relatives' 8 and because of the application
of the Statute of Limitations if the services ended prior to death. 19
Such confusion is probably inherent in any utilizable combination of
an irrevocable and immediately operative instrument with one that
is revocable and inoperative until some future death-a combination
which, in effect, permits a property owner to purchase a valuable
service or right while retaining the benefit of the purchase price for
life.20
2. Public Policy Considerations Against Enforcement. There is one
policy consideration operating against all of these contracts, thereby
causing suspicion and confusion as to their enforcement, i.e., the policy
against allowing distribution contrary to the Statute of Decents is
always present when the deceased fails to comply with the Statute of
Wills.2  There are five other policy considerations operating against
1 4 See Alocco v. Fouche, - Cal. -, 11 Cal. Rptr. 818, 822 (1961);
Monninger v. Koob, 405 Ill. 417, 91 N.E.2d 411 (1950); Boner's Aclm'x v.
Chesnut s Ex'r, 317 S.W.2d 867 (Ky. 1958); Gibson v. Crawford, 247 Ky. 228,
233, 16 S.W.2d 985, 987 (1932); Annot., 169 A.L.R. 11 (1947).
15 See Annot., 32 A.L.R.2d 370 (1953).
16See Bolman v. Overall, 80 Ala. 451, 2 So. 624 (1887); Ward v. Ward, 96
Utah 263, 85 P.2d 635 (1938); Annot., 69 A.L.R. 14, 205, 206 (1930). The
revoked or invalid will may be evidence or memorandum of an oral contract. See
Mussinon's Adm'r v. Herrin, 252 Ky. 495, 67 S.W.2d 710 (1934); Weiss v. Storm,
126 So.2d 295 (Fla. 1961); Hirsch, Contracts to Devise and Bequeath, Part II,
9 Wis. L. Rev. 388, 393 (1934).
17 Atkinson, Wills §§ 44, 48 (2d ed. 1953).
'
8 See Sneed's Ex'r v. Smith, 255 Ky. 132, 138, 72 S.W.2d 1028, 1031 (1934);
Walker v. Dills Adm'r, 186 Ky. 638, 218 S.W. 247 (1920); Annot., 7 A.L.R.2d
12 (1949).
1 Hirsch, Contracts to Devise and Bequeath, Part II, 9 Wis. L. Rev. 388, 401
(1934), says that, in general, an action on the contract to will accrues at promisor's
death but an action on quantum meruit accrues at completion of the services.
This distinction apparently does not apply to quasi-contractual actions for quantum
meruit brought after the death of one who had orally promised to devise realty in
return for the promisee's services, See Nelson v. Christensen, 169 Wis. 373, 172
N.W. 741 (1919); Martin v. Martins Estate, 108 Wis. 284, 84 N.W. 489 (1900).20 27 Yale L.J. 542 (1918).
21Davis v. Jones' Adm'r, 94 Ky. 320, 22 S.W. 331 (1893); 1 Page § 10.1.
See KRS 394.040 for requisites of a valid will and KRS ch. 391 on descent and
distribution. Note that the Davis case mentions the two other exceptions to the
policy against disposition of property contrary to the Statute of Descents-adoption
as prescribed by statute and enforceable contracts to devise.
"Policy" is often misused, but for the purpose of this note "policy con-
siderations" are those considerations of social, economic and political factors which(Footnote continued on next page)
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enforcement in specific cases: (1) In the case of the unmarried couple
there is the possibility the contract also contemplated that the illicit
relationship would continue or that the mother would forbear prose-
cuting for seduction, either of which, if true, would void the entire
contract.22 (2) Contrary to the early common-law policy of ignoring
the illegitimate child as nullius filius, the putative father is no longer
prohibited from contracting to support the child, but he still has no
non-statutory duty to do so.23 Such a promise is not binding unless
the mother has given new consideration.2 4 Her only other recourse
is to bastardy proceedings; if her performance is to forbear this right,
her claim to it must at least be reasonable and in good faith.2 5 A
survival of the early common-law policy is found in the Kentucky
statute denying an illegitimate child the right to inherit from anyone
other than his mother and her kindred.2 6  (3) In certain cases a
minority of states, including Kentucky, find that contracts to surrender
the custody of children may be against public policy as detracting
from parental responsibility and detrimental to child welfare 27 (4)
Attempts to enforce alleged personal service contracts frequently en-
counter the presumption of gratuity which the law raises when the
parties are relatives.2 8 (5) The policy consideration which has the
most important practical effect is the policy supporting the Statute of
Frauds, as developed infra.
3. Failure to Write the Contract or Will. The third source of con-
fusion is the fact that generally when the controversy reaches the court
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
impel the court to adopt a certain course of action, which thereafter is called a
"policy."
The "policy" supporting the Statute of Wills may be a seventh "policy con-
sideration" in cases concerning contracts to make mutual wills. Lindley v. Lindley,
67 N.M. 439, -, 856 P.2d 455, 459 (1960) said: "For reasons of public
policy, courts should be cautious to sustain contracts to make mutual wills, be-
cause such contracts, in effect, destroy the revocability of wills, and fail to allow
for changes in circumstances as years pass."2 2 See Bowling v. Bowling's Adm'r, 222 Ky. 396, 300 S.W. 876 (1927);
Steele v. Crawford, 197 Ky. 798, 248 S.W. 197 (1923); Doty's Adin'r v. Doty's
Guardian, 118 Ky. 204, 80 S.W. 803 (1904).2 3 Hehr's Adm'r v. Hehr, 288 Ky. 580, 157 S.W.2d 111 (1941); Mercer v.
Mercer's Adm'r, 87 Ky. 30, 7 S.W. 401 (1888); Annot., 30 A.L.R. 1067 (1924).
24 Steele v. Crawford, 197 Ky. 790, 248 S.W. 197 (1923) (dictum).
25 See Fiege v. Boehm, 210 Md. 352, 123 A.2d 316 (1956); 1 Williston,
Contracts § 135 (rev. ed. 1936).2 6 See KRS 391.090; Napier v. Hodge, 293 S.W.2d 870 (Ky. 1956). There is
also a slight survival of this policy in statutory form in New York. See Application
of Norman, 205 N.Y.S.2d 260, 264 (1960) (dictum). Also, New Mexico Stat. Ann.
§ 29-1-18 (1953) provides that illegitimate children may inherit from their
fathers only if his recognition of them is in writing.
27 See supra note 7.
28See Annot., 7 A.L.R.2d 12 (1949).
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there is no writing. Due to ignorance of the law and to mutuality of
trust between the parties, the contract is seldom reduced to writing.
Furthermore, the will is seldom executed because of the fear of the
aged property owners that the services might deteriorate or the general
irresponsibility of the putative father and the intimacy of situations
concerning children born out of wedlock. Thus the surviving promisee
is frequently left with only an oral contract in return for years of
service, surrender of a private home, surrender of custody of a child,
or expenditure for supporting a child whom the father had a statutory
duty to support.
The policy consideration against irregular distribution is supported
by even more suspicion when such is attempted without a written
instrument -9 due to the increased opportunity for fraud and the dif-
ficulty of disproving an alleged contract to devise.30 This suspicion,
plus the ancient policy "requiring all contracts touching lands to be
reduced to writing,"3' has had profound legal consequences; nearly all
states have denied effect to nuncupative wills.32 At least ten have
extended their Statutes of Frauds to expressly include contracts to
will.33 The courts of the rest, including Kentucky's, hold contracts to
devise realty or an estate including realty to be within their Statutes
of Frauds as a "contract or sale of lands"34 thereby rendering oral
29 Rash v. Peoples Deposit Bank & Trust Co., 91 F. Supp. 825, 826 (E.D.Ky.
1950) (concerned a lost contract, but the opinion explained the basis of this
suspicion); Napier v. Hodge, 293 S.W.2d 870 (Ky. 1956); 1 Page §§ 10.10, 10.43.
30 Broughton v. Broughton, 203 Ky. 692, 262 S.W. 1089 (1924). See Moreen
v. Carlson's Estate, 865 IlM. 482, 6 N.E.2d 871 (1937); Hunter v. Allen, 174 Ore.
261, 147 P.2d 213 (1944).3  Tiggelbeck v. Russell, 187 Ore. 554, , 213 P.2d 156, 161 (1949).
32 KRS 394.040 requires a will to be written. KRS 394.050 provides for the
standard exception as to the oral wills of active soldiers and sailors, but even these
are limited to personalty. Certain minor exceptions have been made as to
personalty. See Annot., 1916E L.R.A. 1132; 2 Page §§ 20.13-.16.33 Ala. Code Recomp. tit. 20 § 3(6) (1958); Alaska Comp. Laws Ann. §
58-2(b) (Supp. 1960); Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 44-101(8) (1956); Cal. Civil Code §
1624(6); Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 2715 (1953); Hawaii Rev. Laws ch. 190, §
5 (1956); Me. Rev. Stat. ch. 119, § 1 (1954); Mass. Laws Ann. ch. 259, § 5
(1956); N. Y. Pers. Prop. Laws § 31; N. C. Gen. Stat. § 22-3 (1953) (applies only
to contracts with illiterate Cherokee Indians); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2107.04
(1954).
New Mexico's statutes treat these contracts uniquely. N. M. Stat. Ann. §
31-8-14 (1953)provides that all claims against the estates of deceased persons
growing out of alleged contracts to adopt or to treat claimant as an heir must be
written and signed "unless the claimant shall prove ... that he carried out and
fulfilled all of the terms of said contract." This amounts to legislative recognition
of the principle that part performance will take oral contracts to devise out of the
Statute of Frauds. New Mexico is also unique in that its statutes do not require
land and marriage contracts to be in writing.34 Bitzer v. Moock's Ex'r, 271 S.W.2d 877 (Ky. 1954); Duke's Adm'r v.
Crump, 185 Ky. 323, 215 S.W. 41 (1919); Sparks Contracts to Make Wills 41
(1956); 2 Williston, Contracts § 488 (rev. ed. 19365.
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contracts "unenforceable" or "void."35 However, these contracts are
held not to be within the more-than-one-year provision .8 Neither are
oral contracts to bequeath held to be within the provision requiring
contracts for the sale of personalty, exceeding a certain amount, to be
written.3
7
4. Difficulty in Determining the Value of Performance. As dis-
cussed infra, where the promisee is denied recovery on the contract,
but is given the remedy of restitution, a fourth source of confusion
arises from the difficulty of the rules used in determining the reasonable
value to the promisor of the promisee's performance.
II. R MEDmS OF THEi PoiBnsE aF= BFicA8
A. Restitution of Quantum Meruit
Although the surviving promisee of an alleged oral contract to
devise is without legal remedy on the contract, he may have restitution
of quantum meruit for the benefit unjustly retained by the promisor's
estate so long as promisee's performance is capable of monetary evalua-
tion.8 9 The majority, including Kentucky, allow recovery in quasi-
contract for the reasonable value of the services rendered in reliance
35 The wording of the statute determines whether the oral contract will be
treated as unenforceable or void. A majority provide that such a contract is
unenforceable. 22 Temple L.Q. 340 (1949). Jeanblanc, Restitution Under the
Statute of Frauds: What Constitutes an Unjust Retention, 48 Mich. L. Rev. 934
n.43 (1950) and 2 Williston, Contracts § 526 (rev. ed. 1936) list eighteen states.
KRS 371.010 provides that: "No action shall be brought ... "
36 The rationale is that the promisor may die within the first year; therefore,
the contract is not incapable of being performed within one year. Lee v.
McCrocklin, 247 Ky. 44, 56 S.W.2d 570 (1933); Atkinson, Wills § 48, at 214
(2d ed. 1953).
37 1 Page § 10.11. At one time Kentucky held contra. See infra notes 119
and 120. This, of course, is true only in the absence of a statutory requirement
that all contracts to devise or bequeath be in writing.
38 For cases as to the promisee's remedies during the promisor's lifetime, which
is naturally prior to any breach of a contract to devise, see Annot., 7 A.L.R.2d
1166 (1949).
39 "The doctrine of these cases is predicated on the premises that the
deceased has actually received the benefit of the contract from its performance
by the plaintiff, and it would be unconscionable for him to repudiate it and
retain the consideration." Hinton v. Hinton's Ex'r, 239 Ky. 664, 668, 40 S.W.2d
296, 298 (1931) (dictum).
Of course, the Statute of Frauds bars any action by the promisee for
specific performance or for damages for the breach of contract. See Cheatham's
Ex'r v. Parr, 308 Ky. 175, 214 S.W.2d 91 (1948), for discussion of both rules.
This opinion also discusses the fatal variance which occurred, at least prior to
the adoption of the Civil Rules, when the promisee's pleadings were based upon
an action on an expressed contract. For discussion of this action see 2 Corbin,
Contracts § 436 (1950); Kranskopt, Solving Statute of Frauds Problems, 20 Ohio
St. L.J. 237, 251-63 (1959), contains a modem explanation directed toward the
practicing attorney.
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upon the oral contract,40 without restriction to its terms.41 The rules
used in ascertaining reasonable value coupled with the existence of
two other views as to the method of measurement of the unjust enrich-
ment-oral agreement and the cost to the promisee 42-constitute the
fourth source of confusion.
Loose language in opinions, rules of evidence and rules of damages
used in this determination lend these quasi-contractual actions such a
character that they cannot be distinguished from actions on expressed
contracts.43 To the extent that they are not distinguished, there is a
clear violation of the purpose of the Statute of Frauds which was to
prevent any enforcement of unwritten but expressed land contracts
whether they be oral or implied-in-fact.44 The following are examples
of failures to make this distinction. In most quasi-contractual actions
the "promise" and the other terms are generally fictions 45 not considered
by the court. However, when an action is in quasi-contract merely to
evade the Statute of Frauds, the majority admit proof of these terms as
evidence of an admission of the value of the promisee's performance 46
and of a transaction resulting in unjust enrichment.47 In quasi-con-
tractual actions, when the parties are relatives, the contract is required
to be proved to rebut a presumption of gratuity.48 Where personal
services are given for the purchase of land there is very little authority
for allowing the value of the land to be shown.49 However, where the
oral contract is to devise, the suspicion surrounding these agreements
alone requires that the contract be proved. 0 In determining reasonable
40 Duke's Adm'r v. Crump, 185 Ky. 323, 215 S.W. 41 (1919); Restatement,
Contracts § 348, comment a (1932); 49 Am. Jur. Statute of Frauds §§ 569, 571(1943); Jeanblanc, Restitution Under the Statute of Frauds: Measurement of the
Legal Benefit Unjustly Retained, 15 Mo. L. Rev. 1, 10 (1950), contains an
extensive list of cases so holding.
41Corbin, Contracts § 327 (1950); 2 Williston, Contracts § 536 (rev. ed.
1936).
42 See Jeanblanc, Restitution Under the Statute of Frauds: Measurement of
the Legal Benefit Unjustly Retained, 15 Mo. L. Rev. 1 (1950). Kentucky rejected
the first minority view in Hinton v. Hintonds Ex'r, 239 Ky. 664, 40 S.W.2d 296
(1931).4 3 Costigan, Implied-in-Fact Contracts and Mutual Assent, 33 Harv. L. Rev.
376 (1920).
44 McElroy v. Ludlum, 32 N.J.Eq. 828 (1880); Jeanblanc, supra note 42, at 5.
45 2 Corbin, Contracts § 330 (1950).
46 Id. § 328 (Disregard Kentucky cases for they do not support the proposition
for which they are cited.); 2 Williston, Contracts § 536 (rev. ed. 1936); Wood-
ward, Quasi Contracts §§ 103-04 (1913); Annot., 49 A.L.R. 1121 (1927).
47 Krauskopf, Solving Statute of Frauds Problems, 20 Ohio St. L.J. 237,
257-60 (1959).
48ee Annots., 7 A.L.R.2d 8 (1949), 69 A.L.R. 14, 96 (1930).
49 See Offeman v. Robertson-Cole Studios, 80 Cal. App. 1, 251 Pac. 830
1926). Brown, Statute of Frauds § 125 (1870); Annot., 49 A.L.R. 1121, 1124
1927).50 Finn v. Finn's Adm'r, 244 S.W.2d 435 (Ky. 1951); Sparks, Contracts to
Make Wills 140 (1956).
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value of the services, their market value and the situation of the
parties are considered. Since this proof usually includes evidence of
the value of any land involved, the question arises as to how much
probative weight this value should have.
In order to retain any quasi-contractual nature, the value of the
land should be no more than a factor to consider 5' except where the
devise was to be for specific property and where the extent and dura-
tion of the services were known at the time of the contract.52 Such
instances are very rare since performance generally continues until the
promisoer's death. The consideration for the performance is more
frequently a promise to devise an entire estate, to adopt a child, or to
make a child the promisor's heir; thus, the pecuniary value of the
promise or the services is known at the time of the contract. This
exception, if followed, would further confuse the distinction between
actions in quasi-contract and actions on the contract. However, such
confusion is no more than that caused by the failure of most courts to
deduct benefit received by the promisee in room, board, clothing,
education, etc. These deductions would be expected in an action in
quasi-contract 53 where recovery is for unjust enrichment retained
after any benefit received by the plaintiff has been deducted.
Kentucky, likewise, has failed to make the distinction between
actions barred by the Statute of Frauds and those in quasi-contract.
The contract must be established by "clear and convincing" proof;5
the right of a third-party beneficiary to recover in quantum meruit is
not questioned 55 even though he personally has made no performance.
The nature of the services determines the competency of evidence of
the value of the promised consideration. Evidence of the value of the
promised land is incompetent56 except where the value of the per-
formance is immeasurable. This exception, which is peculiar to Ken-
tucky, is discussed, infra, under the heading of "The Waters Rule."
In most cases, quantum meruit is not granted simply because the
services rendered for the promisor are found to be incapable of
51 See Annot., 106 A.L.R. 742, 753 (1937).52 See Quirk v. Bank of Commerce & Trust Co., 244 Fed. 682 (6th Cir. 1917);
Reynolds v. Connor, 190 Okla. 323, 123 P.2d 664 (1941); Woodward, Quasi
Contracts § 105 (1913).
53 This is true for all Kentucky cases cited for either restitution of quantum
meruit or the Waters rule infra page 232, and is exemplified in the Miller case.
54See Finn v. Finn's Admr, 244 S.W.2d 435 (Ky. 1951); Broughton v.
Broughton's Adm'r, 203 Ky. 692, 696, 262 S.W. 1089, 1091 (1924).
55 The research for this note revealed no opinion from any court which
questioned the right of a third-party beneficiary of an unenforceable oral contract
to recover in quantum meruit.56 Hinton v. Hinton's Ex'r, 239 Ky. 664, 40 S.W.2d 296 (1931); Benge's
Adm'r v. Creech, 175 Ky. 6, 192 S.W. 817 (1917).
[Vol. 50,
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reduction to a "reasonable value" in monetary terms due to their filial
and intimate nature and the fact that the promisee's whole life has
been altered in rendering them. He has often given up home and
occupation to live and care for the invalid promisor for several years.
The unwed mother's forbearance has consistently been treated as im-
measurable57 even though an adequate measure apparently would be
an estimate of the amount she could have received through bastardy
proceedings plus interest.58 However, custody is often surrendered to
the father,59 thereby defying any rational attempt to place pecuniary
value on the consideration he received. The impossibility of evaluating
love and affection is also generally a barrier to awarding money dam-
ages for the breach of agreements to adopt or to surrender custody of
a child.60
B. The Majority Rule Allowing Specific Performance
1. The Rule in General. Where the promisee's performance is im-
measurable, the vast majority (formerly not including Kentucky)
recognize that only the immediate parties were capable of determining
an adequate value for the promisee's performance and therefore em-
ploy the doctrine of part performance to take the contract to devise
out of the Statute of Frauds and decree specific performance.61 This is
5 7Miller v. Miller, 335 S W.2d 884 (Ky. 1960) (the principal case)-
Moore's Adm'r v. Wagner's Adm'r, 243 Ky. 351, 48 S.W.2d 15 (1932), allowed
the personal representative of an illegitimate child who had predeceased his
father to recover as a third-party beneficiary; Bowling v. Bowling's Adm'r, 222
Ky. 896, 800 S.W. 876 (1927). In none of these cases was the custody of the
child surrendered by the mother.
58 Under KRS 406.090, she could have recovered periodic payments in any
amount fixed by the jury. Consideration would be given to the father's financial
status. See Annot., 74 A.L.R. 763 (1931).
59 See Doty's Adm'r v. Doty's Guardian, 118 Ky. 204, 80 S.W. 803 (1904);
Benge v. Hiatt's Adm'r 82 Ky. 666, 56 Am. Rep. 912 (1885). In the Benge case,
the value of the things'promised was considered even though the father lived only
a few days after custody was surrendered. See 49 Am. Jur. Statute of Frauds §
531 (1948).60See Annot., 69 A.L.R. 14, 83, 151 (1930).
61 Owens v. McNally, 113 Cal. 444, 45 Pac. 710 (1896), mentioned an
"overwhelming weight of authority"; Annots., 106 A.L.R. 742, 756, 760 (1937),
69 A.L.R. 14, 146 (1930); 1 Page § 10.15 n.6 (Kentucky cases there cited
do not stand for this proposition, but only that the value of the land will be
given); Annot., 15 L.R.A. (N.S.) 466 (1908).
The contrary is the rule in those states where no part performance is
recognized without change in possession. Annot., 69 A.L.R. 14, 139 (1930); 1
Page § 10.1.
For examples of specific performance where the promisee forbore various
legal rights, see Annot., 101 A.L.R. 923, 1114 (1936); 86 U. Det. L.J. 316, 320
(1958).
For examples of specific performance of adoption contracts where the
statutory process for adoption had not been completed, see Annots., 171 A.L.R.
1815 (1947), 142 A.L.R. 84 (1943), 27 A.L.R. 1325 (1923).
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sometimes technically referred to as "quasi-specific performance" since
the decree does not compel the dead promisor to execute a will, but
instead requires his heirs to convey the land.62 Due to the suspicion
cast upon these contracts, the evidence of them is scrutinized with
even more care than in actions for quantum meruit. The quality of
evidence required in different jurisdictions ranges from "clear, explicit,
and definite"'63 to "so strong as to be substantially beyond reasonable
doubt."64
2. The Sound Basis of the Rule. "Equitable fraud" is the ground
for the decree of specific performance. 65 In this note and in the cases
used herein, "equitable fraud" refers to the fact that to allow the
promisor to use the Statute of Frauds as a defense after having
knowingly received the benefits of the promisee's immeasurable per-
formance would work a fraud on the promisee, 6 since this immeasur-
ability precludes an adequate remedy at law. Thus the rendition of
personal services and forbearance of legal rights are sufficient to take
these scrutinized contracts out of the statute notwithstanding the fact
62 1 Page § 10.30; Costigan, Constructive Trusts Based on Promises Made to
Secure Bequests, Devises, or Intestate Succession, 28 Harv. L. Rev. 237, 248-45
(1915).
Of course the right to the decree is conditioned upon proof of inadequacy of
legal remedies and of a legal, reasonable contract. If the performance is im-
measurable, there can be no adequate legal remedy. See 57 Am. Jur. Wills §§
193-96 (1948); 36 U. Det. L.J., 316, 320 (1958).
The California court has developed a very comprehensive rule:
To enforce an oral contract to bequeath or devise property in equity by
quasi-specific performance, it must be shown that the contract is definite
and certain, the consideration adequate, that the contract is founded on
good morals and not against public Volicy, that the character of the
services is such that a money payment would not furnish adequate com-
pensation to the plaintiff, that there is such a change in plaintiff's con-
dition and relations in reliance on the contract that a refusal to comlete
the contract would be a fraud upon him, and that the remedy asked for
is not harsh, oppressive or unlust to innocent third parties. (Emphasis
added.) Walker v. Calloway, 99 Cal.App.2d 675, -, 222 P.2d 455,
459 (1950).63 Thompson v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 863 Mo. 667, -, 253
S.W.2d 116, 120 (1952), required seven more factors to also be present in order
to dualify for specific performance.
64 Sheffield v. Baker, 201 Ark. 527, ed.145 S.W.2d 347, 848 (1940).
These are but two of numerous tests used as sted in 1 Page § 10.43. For the
quality of the proof required in general see 2 Corbin, Contracts § 442 (1950).
65 See Tiggelbeck v. Russell, 187 Ore. 554, 21 P.2d 156 (1949); Annot., 69
A.L.R. 14, 32, 148 (1930); 1 Page § 10.13 n.6.
66 This is substantially the same as Pomeroy's much-used definition found in
4 Pomeroy, Equity jurisprudence § 1409 (5th ed. Symons 1941). However, courts
more frequently say that to deny equitable relief would be to use the Statute to
perpetrate fraud and hardship rather than to prevent them, as is its purpose.
Frequently, this meaning is also conveyed by the axiom that the statute should
be used as "a shield and not a sword." Krauskopf, Solving Statute of Frauds Prob-
lems, 20 Ohio St. L.. 237, 239-50 (1959), contains a good discussion of the
modern interpretation of the term.
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that these performances are uncommon bases67 for application of the
doctrine of part performance.
The decree, however, is well grounded since the doctrine of
equitable fraud is the very basis of the whole doctrine of part per-
formance in the United States.68 These two doctrines have been
referred to as separate devices for taking a contract out of the statute,
and apparently they did originate independently.69 Ten years after
the original Statute of Frauds was enacted, the English Chancellor
began enforcing oral land contracts if the promisee could show his acts
of part performance to be so referable to the oral contract as to give
rise to an inference of some contract relating to land; generally change
of possession was sufficient70 However, due to the influence of Pome-
roy's concept of equitable fraud as the basis of a great part of all
equitable jurisdiction, the American majority now remove contracts
from the statute solely because not to do so would work a fraud on the
promisee.7 1 The basis for these decrees is further strengthened in that
the modem theory of equitable fraud no longer requires misrepresenta-
tion or fraudulent intention on the part of the promisor, which were
required under the old doctrine of equitable estoppel.72
Certain collateral points further support the soundness of these
decrees. (1) The parties rarely intended any pecuniary standard of
67 Assuming that the value of the services is measurable, the reasons why
they are not more frequently used as bases for part performance are:
(1) Generally, services may be adequately compensated in damages at law.(2) A close relationship commonly exists between the parties; therefore,
this type of performance is not necessarily referable to a contract. In
fact, the presumption is contra, and if so, this type of performance is
more likely to be referable to a contract to compensate rather than to
devise.
(3) Proof of the existence of services performed is more difficult to establish
than that of a change in possession, improvements made, or payments
tendered. See 2 Corbin, Contracts § 435 (1950); 14 Harv. L. Rev. 64(1900).6 8 Annots., 101 A.L.R. 923, 935 (1936), 75 A.L.R. 650 (1931); 2 Story,
Equity Jurisprudence § 1045 (14th ed. 1918).69 See Pound, The Progress of the Law 1918-1919-Equity, 33 Harv. L. Rev.
420, 813, 929, 937 (1920).7o Infra note 94; Frame v. Dawson, 14 Ves. Jun. 386, 33 Eng. Rep. 569
(1807). See Moreland, Statute of Frauds and Part Performance, 78 U. Pa. L. Rev.
51, 67 (1929)
71 Even Pound, who supports the view that the two theories should be
distinguished, admits this influence. Supra note 69. This is also evidenced in the
large number of citations to Pomeroy, Specific Performance H9 102-04 (8d ed.
1926) and 4 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence § 1293 (5th ed. Symons 1941), and
the earlier editions of these works. See also the cases in Annot., 101 A.L.R. 928,
935 (1936).
72 S Kauskopf, Solving Statute of Frauds Problems, 20 Ohio St. L.J. 237(1959), for a discussion of the modem theory of equitable fraud in connection
with the older devices for circumventing the Statute of Frauds. See also More-
land, Statute of Frauds and Part Performance, 78 U. Pa. L. Rev. 51, 76 (1929).
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compensation.78 (2) Unlike taking possession, making improvements,
or paying the purchase price as evidentiary acts of part performance,
the requirement of unequivocalness of services and forbearances to a
contract is not strict.74 This fact supports the decree to the extent
that the weight of the defendant's argument that the performance was
equivocal is reduced. If the promisee has taken possession, his case
for entry of a decree is greatly strengthened since possession alone is
recognized as sufficient part performance by England and many Ameri-
can jurisdictions and by a majority if coupled with improvements,
payment, or both.7 5 These situations are exceptional for the promisee
of an oral contract to devise is seldom in a position to take posession
or make improvements since any control he has over the promisors
realty is generally that of an agent. (4) The promisee has always
made full or part payment through his services or forbearance, but
payment alone is never held to be sufficient part performance.7 6 How-
ever, if payment has been made in services or forbearance, the value
of which is immeasurable, this payment is sufficient part performance
and is said to be quite analogous to part performance by a combination
of taking possesion and making improvements,7 7 which is considered
the "strongest and most unequivocal act of part performance."78
C. The Waters or Kentucky Rule
1. In General. Even though the majority rule is based on the
doctrine of equitable fraud, is supported by the intent of the parties,
is grounded upon a type of performance which is analogous to the
strongest acts of part performance, and is made relatively immune
from the risk of supporting fraudulent claims by its requirement of a
high quality of proof of the alleged contract, Kentucky had never
decreed "quasi-performance" prior to the Miller case. Instead, under
78 See Walker v. Calloway, 99 Cal. 675, 222 P.2d 455 (1950); Rhodes v.
Rhodes, 3 Sand. Ch. 279, 16 N.Y. Ch.. 305 (1846); Brinton v. Van Cott, 8 Utah
408, 33 Pac. 218 (1893).
74 The very nature of this type of performance renders strict unequivocalness
relatively impossible for reasons enumerated in supra note 67; thus, a large degree
of discretion is given the chancellor. The result is confusion and conflict on this
point. See 2 Corbin, Contracts § 430, 435, 441 (1950) and 1 Page § 10.13.75 Part performance is an area where generalizations are hard to make, but
there is no shortage of attempts to do so. A concise analysis of the position of
American jurisdictions is found in Chafee & Simpson, Cases on Equity 657 (Ord
ed. 1951) and Chafee & Re, Cases and Materials on Equity 609 (4th ed. 1958).
See generally Annot., 101 A.L.R. 923 (1936); 2 Corbin, Contracts H 420-40
(1950); 19 Ky. L.J. 43 (1931); supra note 70. For examples of combinations of
services and possessions, see Kelly v. Dodge, 334 Mich. 499, 54 N.W.2d 730
(1952); Annot., 101 A.L.R. supra at 1095; 2 Corbin, op. cit. supra, § 437.
76 See 2 Corbin, Contracts § 431 (1950).
7 7 Pomeroy, Specific Performance § 114 (3rd ed. 1926).
78 Id. § 126, at 323; see 2 Corbin, Contracts § 431 (1950).
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the unique Waters rule,7 9 the promisee recovered the value of the
promised realty. The Court of Appeals stated this rule as follows:
[I]n cases in which it is possible to determine from the evidence the
reasonable value of the services performed this will be the measure
of recovery, but where the thing done or services performed are of
such nature as not to admit of a reduction to a monetary value, then
the [oral] contract made between the parties will be received to fix
the value; and in case where lands or other property is agreed to be
devised, the value of such property or land will be considered as the
measure of recovery, though the thing itself cannot be recovered nor
the contract specifically enforced.80
The Waters rule is an example of the fourth source of confusion
because of the similarity of its mode of measuring damages to the
measurement of damages for breach of an express contract.81 For
policy reasons, its requirement that the contract be established by
"clear and convincing" proof 82 was even more exacting in the case
of alleged contracts to forbear from bringing bastardy proceedings.83
Even the Court of Appeals has referred to these recoveries in quantum
meruit as damages for breach of contract.84
Since 1859 the Waters rule has been justified on several grounds:
(1) The doctrine of equitable fraud has been applied to avoid the
defense of the Statute of Frauds in much the same manner as it is
applied by the majority which grant specific performance.8 5 (2) The
contract has been "resorted to, not as the measure of damages for
failing to convey the property, but as constituting the standard of
value established by the promisor himself."86 (3) The rationalization
used to support recovery of quantum meruit has been applied, even
though the unjust enrichment is immeasurable, because the contract
measure of the consideration received is the only measure which will
79 Waters v. Cline, 121 Ky. 611, 85 S.W. 209 (1905). This rule was first
announced in Berry v. Graddy, 58 Ky. 553 (1859), and has been consistently fol-
lowed and referred to in numerous Kentucky opinions. Duke's Adm'r v. Crump,
185 Ky. 323, 215 S.W. 41 (1919), is probably the case most often cited for the
rule.80 Walker v. Dill's Adm'r, 186 Ky. 638, 643, 218 S.W. 247, 249 (1920).
81 See Wallace v. Long, 105 Ind. 522, 5 N.E. 666 (1886); Finn v. Finn's
Adim'r, 244 S.W.2d 485 (Ky. 1951); Costigan, supra note 43, at 387-88 n.19.
827inn v. Finns Adc'r, 244 S.W.2d 435 (Ky. 1951); Broughton v. Brough-
ton, 203 Ky. 692, 262 S.W. 1089 (1924).
83 See Napier v. Hodge, 293 S.W.2d 870 (Ky. 1956).
84 See Hehr's Adm'r v. Hehr, 288 Ky. 580, 584, 157 S.W.2d 111, 113 (1941).
85 For example, Berry v. Graddy, 58 Ky. 553, 558 (1859), stated:
It would, therefore, amount to a fraud upon the former [promisee], after
he has executed the agreement, to deprive him of the benefit of it, on
the ground that the contract was verbal merely. He cannot be restored
to the situation he was before the contract was made, nor can he be
compensated in damages by any other standard than that furnished by
the contract itself.
86As summarized in the Mirler opinion, 335 S.W.2d 885, 888 (Ky. 1960).
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approximate justice.8 7 (4) The truism, "we cannot recede from the
doctrine so often laid down, 8 8 has been employed as a crutch.
2. The Result of a Refusal to Recognize the Part Performance
Doctrine. An analysis of the Kentucky opinions, however, clearly
reveals that the real basis of the Waters rule was a reluctance to leave
the four-state minority which did not recognize the part performance
doctrine, and that the Waters rule was adopted as the next most
equitable substitute for specific performance."9 This minority of Mis-
sissippi90 North Carolina,"' Kentucky and Tennessee 2 adopted the
English Statute of Frauds almost in its entirety.98  But their courts
have refused to follow either the English rule that possession is suf-
ficient part performance, which developed only ten years after the
statute was adopted in 1676,94 or the even more exacting rules of part
performance, which have developed in this country.9 5 Kentucky's
position is even more peculiar due to her close relationship with
Virginia, which had adopted the liberal English part performance rule
before Kentucky became a state.96
"No more distinct or forceful statement of the minority doctrine
exists than in"9 7 the 1808 Kentucky case of Grant's Heirs v. Craig-
miles.98 The English doctrine of part performance was rejected and
87 Waters v. Cline, 121 Ky. 611, 617, 85 S.W. 209, 210 (1905), said:
The cases . . . following Berry v. Graddy, rest on the idea that the
defendant, having received the consideration of the (oral] contract, will
not be permitted to retain what he has thus received, when he repudiates
the contract....
88 Id. at 618, 85 S.W. at 210.
89 See, e.g., Walker v. Dills Adm'r, 186 Ky. 638, 218 S.W. 247 (1920);
Waters v. Cline, 121 Ky. 611, 85 S.W. 209 (1905).9 0 Howie v. Swaggard, 142 Miss. 409, 107 So. 556 (1926); McGuire v.
Stevens, 42 Miss. 724 (1869); Annot., 101 A.L.R. 923, 947 (1936).9 1lBallard v. Boyette, 171 N.C. 24, 86 S.E. 175 (1915); Luten v. Badham,
127 N.C. 96, 37 S.E. 143 (1900); Annot., 101 A.L.R. 923, 947 (1936).92 Goodloe v. Goodloe, 116 Tenn. 252, 92 S.W. 767 (1906), recognized the
minority position as a "rule of property"; Annot., 101 A.L.R. 923, 948 (1936).
93 19 Ky. L.J. 43, 44 (1931).
94Butcher v. Stapely, 1 Vern. 363, 23 Eng. Rep. 524 (1685); Foxcreft v.
Lester, Colles 108, 1 Eng. Rep. 205 (1700). See 18 Ky. L.J. 379 (1930); supra
note 70.
95 See supra note 75.
98 See Caldwell v. Carrington's Heirs, 34 U.S. 86 (1835) (written by Mar-
shall, C. J.); McMillin v. McMillin, 23 Ky. (7 T.B. Mon.) 560 (1828).
One reason why the Kentucky court failed to follow the English cases may
have been an 1807 Kentucky statute prohibiting reading or treating as authority in
Kentucky courts any English post revolutionary cases. Professor Dukeminier in
Kentucky Perpetuities Law Restated and Reformed, 49 Ky. L.J. 1 n.9 (1960),
used this same reasoning as a possible answer to why English authority was not
followed in a certain area in the law of perpetuities. See Ky. Acts 1807, ch. 7r
Bichman v. Hoffman, 3 Ky. (Hardin) 356, 873 (1808).9 7 Annot., 101 A.L.R. 923, 944 (1936).
984 Ky. (1 Bibb) 203 (1808).
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specific performance was denied to a vendee's heirs even though the
deceased had made part payment in services of the "sixty pounds per
hundred" and had acquired possession before being killed by the
Indians. Why this opinion would become the basis of Kentucky's
position as the outstanding advocate of the minority rule is hard to
understand. The English rule requires only the taking of possession,
but here the promisee had also made part payment. Furthermore, the
holding was merely that the evidence was insufficient to establish the
contract so that the vendee's heirs would not have been entitled to a
decree even "if the statute were out of the way";99 therefore, the dis-
cussion of part performance is dictum. Moreover, the decision could
have been rested on the fact that the defendant did not plead the
Statute of Frauds; normally this omission would constitute a waiver
of that defense. 100 The decision is also weak authority because it is
based upon these two grounds either of which would have been suf-
ficient.
Grant's Heirs and subsequent decisions continuously rejected the
doctrine of part performance because (1) it would make the Statute
of Frauds "a dead letter,"'101 (2) it would increase litigation since it
was an "uncertain and perplexed rule of action,"10 2 and (3) it was
supported by policy considerations outweighed by those supporting
the statute. Grant's Heirs admitted that a contract could often be
proved by parol evidence as strongly as if it were in writing and that
in such cases the statute would be a protector of fraud. "[B]ut this is
only a partial evil resulting from the general good" for which the one
claiming under the contract "must take the blame himself, for it is his
own folly or negligence that has made him part with performance" in
the absence of the "requisite written evidence. "1t 3 Then, to defend the
decision against contentions that it rejected the doctrine of equitable
fraud, the court rationalized that "the statute has for its object the
prevention of perjuries, as well as frauds. . ."104 (4) The court
pictured the English rule as based upon the proposition that the
99 Id. at 208.
10 0 See Annot., 49 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1, 35 (1911). However, the court in Grant's
Heirs v. Craigmiles, 4 Ky. (1 Bibb) 203, 209 (1808), justified its consideration
of this defense: "The omission of the guardian to insist upon a legal defense...
ought not to be prejudiced to the interest of the infants." This appears to be the
eneral rule. See Annot., 158 A.L.R. 165 (1945); Annot., 32 L.R.A. 671, 680
1896).
101 See Hayden v. M'Ilvain, 7 Ky. (4 Bibb) 57, 59 (1815); Johnston's
Devisees v. MacConnell, 6 Ky. (3 Bibb) 2 (1813).
102 rant's Heirs v. Craigmiles, 4 Ky. (1 Bibb) 203, 205 (1808).
103 Id. at 206.
104 Haydon v. M'Ilvain, 7 Ky. (4 Bibb) 57, 59 (1815).
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unequivocal act of the possession was sufficient evidence of the con-
tract to satisfy the framers of the statute. 05 And then it said: "T] o
require a higher degree of evidence... is not for the purpose of aiding
the plaintiff, but for protecting the defendant against the fraud of the
plaintiff and the perjury of the witness." 0 6 As to the English rule this
conclusion may have been correct,10 7 but the Court of Appeals has
never recognized that the American doctrine of part performance is
based upon equitable fraud rather than unequivocal or evidentiary
acts. Upon this questionable reasoning Kentucky followed and de-
veloped the minority rule as a "rule of property"'08 to the extent that
to trace its history would be impractical and superfluous. 0 9
3. Hidden Retreat from the Refusal to Recognize Part Perform-
ance. The Kentucky court for a long time has indicated that its rejec-
tion of part performance was more consistent in theory than in the
practical implications of its decisions. The following are examples. A
dictum in 1868 indicated that equitable fraud could justify specific
performance,"10 but the suggestion was not adopted."' In 1898, a
vendee's relinquishment of his easements in consideration of an ease-
ment over other land and the use of the latter easement by his heirs
were said to be "such a part performance of the parol contract for a
right of way as took it out of the statute.""l2 By 1890 the doctrine of
part performance was established as to contracts not to be performed
within one year so long as they had been fully performed by the
plaintiff."13 In 1954 a contract proved only by memoranda (which on
sound principles should have been considered incomplete as a matter
of law) was specifically enforced (without mentioning part per-
105 Grant's Heirs v. Craigmiles, 4 Ky. (1 Bibb) 203, 205 (1808), exemplifies
this fact in the following quotation:
Some judges have thought that another kind of evidence was equipollent
with written evidence; such as paying the consideration, being let into
possession, making valuable improvements, etc., which are deemed part
performance.
106 Ibid.
'o7 See Moreland, Statute of Frauds and Part Performance, 78 U. Pa. L. Rev.
51, 69-73 (1929); supra notes 75 and 94.
108 This is the status of the minority's consistent rejection as phrased by the
Tennessee court in Goodloe v. Goodloe, 116 Tenn. 252, 92 S.W. 767 (1906).
109 For annotations to numerous cases see, Legislative Research Commission,
Notes and Annots. to the Kentucky Revised Statutes 194 (1944 Supp. 1960).
110 Overstreet v. Rice, 67 Ky. (4 Bush) 1 (1868).
l' See Annot., 101 A.L.R. 923, 945 (1936).
1"2 Beinlein v. Johns, 102 Ky. 570, 577, 44 S.W. 128, 130 (1898); but see
Annot., 101 A.L.R. 923, 946 n.69 (1936), for a possible explanation.
"3 See Pilcher v. Stadler, 276 Ky. 450, 124 S.W.2d 475 (1939); Smith v.
Cloyd, 260 Ky. 393, 85 S.W.2d 873 (1935); Dant v. Head, 12 Ky. L. Rep. 153,
13 S.W. 1073 (1890), as interpreted by East Tenn. Tel. Co. v. Paris Elec. Co.,
156 Ky. 762, 162 S.W. 580 (1914); 2 Corbin, Contracts § 459, at 587 (1950).
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formance) merely to avoid perpetrating a fraud upon the plaintiff due
to his extended possession and inadequacy of legal remedy." 4
Several oral contracts for the purpose of dealing in realty are en-
forced simply by finding them not to be within the statute rather than
that part performance has taken them out of the statute. An oral
partnership agreement for the purpose of dealing in realty is not
within the statute although such a joint purchase would be, without
the element of partnership." 5 Verbal agreements to buy" 6 or sell" 7
realty for another are not within the statute unless the agent buys in
his name and with his money at a non-judicial sale.i" In 1935 a
contract to bequeath was held to be within the provision of the Uni-
form Sales Act requiring a contract for the sale of personalty exceeding
five-hundred dollars to be written;" 9 however, in 1951 this decision
was overruled as applying to contracts to bequeath for services.120
Under a theory of constructive trust, Kentucky and a small minority
enforce oral land trusts for third person cestui without requiring a
confidential relationship,' 2 ' a rule which Scott considers "a clear viola-
tion of the Statute of Frauds."' 22 Thus, if A conveys to B upon an oral
"4 Phelps v. Ham, 273 S.W.2d 814 (Ky. 1954), enforced a contract to buy
realty which was found to have been sufficiently evidenced by simple receipts 0f
monthly payments of $41.67 signed by the vendee. Since these receipts were
equivocal either as receipts for monthly rent or for installment payments of a
purchase price at $500 per year, they apparently were insufficient memoranda as
a matter of law.
115 Jones v. Nickell, 297 Ky. 81, 179 S.W.2d 195 (1944).
116 Davis v. Spicer, 128 S.W. 294 (Ky. 1910).
117 Oliver v. Morgan, 198 Ky. 442, 248 S.W. 1020 (1928); Talbet v. Bowman,
8 Ky. (1 A.K. Mar.) 436 (1819).
"' See Day v. Amburgey, 147 Ky. 123, 143 S.W. 1033 (1912). But see,
infra note 149.
"19 Maloney v. Maloney, 258 Ky. 567, 80 S.W.2d 611 (1935), concerned an
estate containing both realty and personalty where action to impress a trust was
denied because it was a "sale" of personalty over $500 and thus within Ky. Stat.
§ 2651b-4 (Carroll's 1930).
120 Finn v. Finn's Adm'r, 244 S.W.2d 435 (Ky. 1951), concerned KRS
361.040, now KRS 355.2-201 (Uniform Commercial Code § 2-201).
121 Newton v. Newtons Adm'r, 214 Ky. 278, 283 S.W. 83 (1926); Becker v.
Neurath, 149 Ky. 421, 149 S.W. 857 (1912). In these cases there was a con-
fidential relationship between the grantor and grantee, but no emphasis was placed
upon that fact. Where there is such a relationship, a majority will impose a trust
(1 Scott, Trusts § 45.2 (2d ed. 1956).); therefore, it follows, that, where the land
was devised or allowed to descend by intestacy to the defendant in reliance upon
his oral promise to convey to another, the promise is enforced "everywhere"
because the confidential relationship is inherent in these situations. 2 Corbin,
Contracts § 401, at 381 (1950).
A confidential relationship is necessary in Kentucky only if the oral promise
was made after the absolute conveyance. Shortridge v. Shortridge, 207 Ky. 790,
270 S.W. 47 (1925). See Huff v. Fuller, 197 Ky. 119, 246 S.W. 149 (1922).
One reason for Kentucky's position is that she has not enacted the seventh
and eighth sections of the original Statute of Frauds, which required express
trusts in land to be in writing.
122 1 Scott, Trusts 333 (2d ed. 1956).
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trust for C or upon an oral contract to convey to C, Kentucky will raise
a constructive trust in favor of C so long as B merely promised to so
convey and thereby induced A to convey to him. 23 The normal requi-
sites for imposition of a trust-actual fraud, duress, undue influence-
need not be shown.1 24 The only reason given why a constructive trust
is not imposed in favor of the promisee of an oral contract to devise
is that the parol promise is made by the title-holder whereas it must
be made by the person to whom the title-holder conveys.12 5 Thus,
only a devisee who orally agreed with his devisor to hold or dispose
of property in a given way is subjected to possible imposition of this
constructive trust, which is said to be impressed upon the land before
the devisee is vested with title. 26 Notwithstanding the vagueness of
this distinction, such equitable relief is liberally granted to the bene-
ficiary when necessary to prevent the perpetration of fraud, 27 even
where the arrangement is unenforceable by the grantor for reasons
other than the Statute of Frauds.128 The Kentucky court gave the
following rationalization for this circumvention of the statute: "the
reason is that a constructive trust is raised in equity from the nature
of the transaction rather than created by the verbal contract."2 9
In 1915, Skinner v. Rasche'3 0 specifically enforced an oral contract
to devise (as a defense) by construing the facts to justify the imposi-
tion of a constructive trust. A deceased couple had orally promised to
devise all their property to defendant, then five-years-old, in considera-
tion of surrender of custody by her parents. Subsequently, the husband
conveyed all his realty to his wife whose devise to defendant was
considered void, at least for the purpose of the holding. The property
owned by the wife at her death had come to her from three sources,
part by deed from her husband made after their contract to devise, a
second part (not owned by him at the time of that deed) by his will,
and a third part by her purchase. As to the two parts which came
from him, her title was always impressed with a constructive trust to
carry out his contract to devise. The court, however, enforced a trust
123 Becker v. Neurath, 149 Ky. 421, 149 S.W. 857 (1912).
124 Ibid. These traditional requirements are discussed in 4 Pomeroy, Equity
Jurisprudence § 1053 (5th ed. Symons 1941).
125 Becker v. Neurath, 149 Ky. 421, 425, 149 S.W. 857, 859 (1912).
12 6 Shrader's Exr v. Shrader, 228 Ky. 374, 15 S.W.2d 246 (1929).
127 See Stiefvater v. Stiefvater, 246 Ky. 646, 53 S.W.2d 926 (1932); Rudd v.
Gates, 191 Ky. 456, 230 S.W. 906 (1921); Gilmer, Current Developments in
Resulting Trusts and Constructive Trusts in Kentucky, 42 Ky. L.J. 455, 463 (1954).
128 See Stiefvater v. Stiefvater, 246 Ky. 646, 53 S.W.2d 926 (1932), which
concerned a bootlegger's conveyance to his wife, to avoid possible attachment for
fines in the future, in consideration of an oral promise that upon his death she
would convey to his son.
129 Stiefvater v. Stiefvater, 246 Ky. 646, 648, 53 S.W.2d 926, 927 (1932).
130 165 Ky. 108, 176 S.W. 942 (1915).
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in defendant's favor as to all three parts. The only interest the
defendant could possibly have had in the part acquired by the wife
by purchase was by virtue of the wife's contract to devise. As to this
part the Waters rule would have entitled defendant to damages in the
amount of the value of the property. The court, in imposing a con-
structive trust on this part, in effect, specifically enforced the wife's
oral contract to devise. Had the Statute of Frauds been considered,
this decision would have been pure recognition of part performance.
Possible explanations as to why the statute was not discussed are that
it was not pleaded or that the court was misled by the fact that the
major portion of the property involved in the case was impressed with
a constructive trust to which the statute does not apply.'3 1 The court
recognized the defendant's continuous rendition of personal services as
sufficient consideration to support the wife's oral reiteration of the
contract after her inability to contract as a married woman was re-
moved by the Weisinger law.132 Subsequent opinions have stated that
the Skinner holding specifically enforced an oral contract to devise
because it was "an exceptional case." 33 Apparently, this was in refer-
ence to the fact that the will might have been held valid as to the
defendant, a devisee, had she not been one of the attesting witnesses.
As to restrictive covenants which run with the land, House con-
cluded "that the modem Kentucky Court would enforce any oral
promises of the covenantor to bind his land when the covenantee's
restriction is written in the original agreement" 1 4 notwithstanding the
contention that such are required by the Statute of Frauds to be in
writing.
35
Note that the common reason for granting relief in these decisions,
so similar to that of employing the doctrine of part performance, is
that to do otherwise would be inequitable. However, in one respect,
Kentucky has always expressly admitted the harshness of not recog-
nizing part performance by granting the promisee an equitable lien
on the realty for his expense incurred in reliance upon the oral con-
tract.13 Thus a promisee in possession who recovered under the
Waters rule could remain in possession until the promisors estate paid
131 See Gilmer, Current Developments in Resulting Trusts and Constructive
Trusts in Kentucky, 42 Ky. L.J. 455 (1954).
132 Ky. Stat. §§ 2127-48 (Carrolls 1936).
'33 Broughton v. Broughton, 203 Ky. 692, 696, 262 S.W. 1089, 1090 (1924).
134 Note, 45 Ky. L.J. 637, 645 (1957).
13 Id. at 641. See Sims, The Law of Real Covenants: Exceptions to the
Restatement, 30 Cornell L.Q. 1, 27 (1944).
13 6 Crain v. Crain, 197 Ky. 813, 814, 248 S.W. 176, 177 (1922) (dictum,
containing a good statement of the rule); Usher's Ex'r v. Flood, 83 Ky. 552(1884); 22 Ky. L.J. 434 (1934).
19611 NOTES
KmTucaKY LAw JOURNAL
the value of the land which would be to the same effect as damages at
law followed by levy of execution.
This discussion exemplifies the merit in Corbin's conclusion that
"Kentucky is working out its own part performance doctrines."137
Corbin also correctly concludes that the denial of part performance
has neither avoided litigation, upheld the legislative intent, nor made
the law less perplexing as predicted in Grant's Heirs.3s Corbin says
that it is "doubtful" that such denials are still the law in Kentucky.139
D. Miller v. Miller: A Slight Modification of the Majority Rule
Even though both parties in the Miller case conceded that the
value of the mother's forbearance was immeasurable, relief could have
been granted under any one of three theories. By further engaging
in fiction, the Skinner holding could have been extended to impose a
constructive trust upon the land as of the time the contract was made.
This would have been inadvisable since a prerequisite for imposing a
constructive trust, notwithstanding the questionable portion of the
Skinner holding,140 is that legal title must be conveyed to a third party
who thereby becomes charged with a duty to the beneficiary.141 By
affirming the trial court's application of the Waters rule, the plaintiff
would have received the approximated value of the realty. The Waters
rule has found support in only three states142 and has been overruled
after once being followed in three others.143 It has been frequently
criticized;14 4 but never more ably than by Judge Palmore in the Miller
opinion.
The third possible theory, which was the one employed, was to
decree the transfer of the title as if the oral contract were specifically
enforced. In justifying this innovation in Kentucky, Judge Palmore
first pictured the Waters rule as a sophistical fiction "originating in
Victorian circumlocution"' 45 under which the court circumvented the
1372 Corbin, Contracts § 443, at 531 (1950).
1381bid; Grant's Heirs v. Craigminles, 4 Ky. (1 Bibb) 203 (1808).
'39 2 Corbin, Contracts § 499 n.1 (Supp. 1960).
140 Supra note 130 and related text.
'41 See 4 Pomeroy, Equity jurisprudence § 1044 (5th ed. Symons 1941).
14 2 Benner v. Sledd, 158 Ark. 47, 249 S.W. 556 (1928); Gordon v. Spellmen,
145 Ga. 682, 89 S.E. 749 (1916); Hooks v. Bridgewater, 111 Tex. 122, 229 S.W.
1114 (1921); Henderson v. Davis, 191 S.W. 858 (Tex. 1917) (dictum).
143 Wallace v. Long, 105 Ind. 522, 5 N.E. 666 (1886); Grantham v. Grant-
ham, 205 N.C. 363, 171 S.E. 331 (1933); Erben v. Loriller, 19 N.Y. 299 (1859).
'44 E.g., Reynolds v. Conner, 190 Okla. 323, 123 P.2d 664 (1941); Frieders
v. Frieders' Estate, 180 Wis. 430, 193 N.E. 77 (1923); Jeanblanc, Restitution
Under the Statute of Frauds: Measurement of the Legal Benefit Unjustly Retained,
15 Mo. L. Rev. 1, 14-15 (1950).
145 Miller v. Miller, 335 S.W.2d 884, 889 (Ky. 1960). Note that all quota-
tions in this and the succeeding paragraph are from the first five of the last seven
paragraphs of the Miller opinion at pages 888-89.
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Statute of Frauds by requiring the contract to be established by clear
and convincing proof and by allowing the value of the expressed con-
sideration to be recovered, but then denied specific enforcement be-
cause the Statute of Frauds was still applicable. Second, the Waters
rule was recognized as having rendered the statute "useless and dead"
to the extent of this circumvention. Third, the court refused to com-
pletely overrule the Waters rule even though it recognized that such a
"sacrifice of the objectives underlying the Statute of Frauds in favor
of a benevolent solicitude for those who would suffer irreparable hard-
ship . . . may be of debatable wisdom," simply because the Waters
rule is "so firmly entrenched as a part of the law." But to the extent
the Waters rule resulted in a "hybrid rule calling for an artificial meas-
ure of recovery in lieu of the real thing," it was overruled for
having "neither logical nor reasonable basis."
The phrase "artificial measure" was used in reference to the trial
court's reliance upon the "permissive guesses" of witnesses as a basis
for its "educated guess" as to the value of the property. This was the
context in which the Waters doctrine was overruled for being a pos-
sible perpetrator of fraud, for "if the guess is wrong, one party or the
other will suffer," but "if the property itself be decreed" neither will
be prejudiced.
In summary, Miller has actually (though perhaps not theoretically)
placed Kentucky in the majority (which specifically enforce oral con-
tracts to devise) to the extent that an oral contract to devise estab-
lishted by clear and convincing proof may be specifically enforced
where the value of the surviving promisee's performance is immeasur-
able and the land is available for transfer. The reasoning is that in
view of the uncertainty in valuation of land by a trier of fact, the only
way the court can prevent perpetration of fraud is to decree transfer
of the realty. If a reasonable value can be placed upon the per-
formance, recovery will still be for that amount in quantum meruit.
If this is not possible, but the value of the land has been stipulated or
may be accurately determined without possibility of prejudice to either
party, recovery will still be for this value under the Waters rule.
III. CONCLUSION: SPECIFIC PEPFORMANCE OF ORAL CONTRACrS TO
SELL BEAL= IN KENTUCKY
'Tart performance" was not mentioned in the Miller opinion; the
court expressly refused to completely overrule the Waters doctrine.
Furthermore, the logical inference is that Judge Palmore purposely
employed only the effect of part performance in order to leave the
court free to again reject the doctrine. Nevertheless, there are four
1961]
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reasons why the opinion could serve as the basis for the general
adoption of that doctrine, and thereby remove Kentucky from the
four-state minority which has not specifically enforced a commercial
oral land contract. Since these reasons, as listed below, are stated in
summary form, they should be considered in context with their respec-
tive discussions in Parts I and II. (1) If an oral contract to devise
in consideration of not bringing bastardy proceedings can be spe-
cifically enforced, a fortiori, an oral contract to sell realty should be.
Courts are much more reluctant to specifically enforce oral contracts
to devise than oral contracts to sell land due to the confusion and
suspicion inseparably connected with the former.146 The commercial
contract is burdened by only one consideration of public policy 47 and
is not confused by the law of wills; 148 in contrast, the Miller contract
was of the most policy-ridden type,149 excepting only those concerning
surrender of custody.150 (2) The only prerequisite for the Miller
decree which precludes it from being an out-right recognition of part
performance is that the value of the land must be incapable of any
fairly accurate measurement.' 51 This factor can be completely nullified
if the Kentucky court will find that the inherent uniqueness of land,
which has always rendered legal damages inadequate as a remedy for
breach of a written contract to sell or devise land,152 also applies to
land under an oral commercial contract. To hold that land is "in-
herently" unique when the subject of a written contract, but not unique
when the subject of an oral contract would be irrational since the
characteristics of land are not affected by any contract. (3) The
Miller opinion emphasizes the absurdity of not theoretically recog-
nizing part performance since the statute is equally infringed upon
whether the contract be used for the purpose of influencing the amount
of recovery or as the foundation of the action. 153 The Court of Appeals
146See Part I, B, on pages 221-26.
147 The policy supporting the Statute of Frauds. See supra note 31 and
related text.
148 See Part I, B, 1, on pages 221-23.
149 See Part I, B, 2 and 3 on pages 223-26.
150 See supra note 7.
.51 See Part II, D, on pages 240-41.
1525 Corbin, Contracts § 1143 (1951). Professor Moreland, in annotating
the Kentucky cases, concedes that they are in accord with Restatement, Contracts
§ 360 (1932), which recognizes the conclusive presumption that damages will
not afford an adequate remedy for breach of a written land contract. 24 Ky. L.J.
272, 278 (1936). For student notes discussing his view that specific performance
should be granted only as a matter of discretion due to the modem American
conception that land has primarily only commercial value, see 23 Ky. L.. 380
(1935) and 21 Ky. L.J. 348 (1933).
153 See Part II, D, on pages 240-41.
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has expressly admitted this disregard for the statute previously,'54 and
implies the same by frequently enforcing oral contracts concerning
interests in realty under the guise of less realistic theories. 55 These
influences, coupled with the weight of Corbin's conclusions, 156 tend to
negate all reasons for not recognizing part performance given in the
unbroken line of cases following Grant's Heirs.157 (4) The Miller
decree was not based upon unequivocal acts but upon equitable fraud
-the basis of the entire doctrine of part performance in America. 58
Kentucky has made extended use of this doctrine' 59 but never more
liberally. No evidence showed either party would in fact suffer ir-
reparable injury; but the court considered the possibility of such to be
sufficient even though claimed by the promisor's heirs rather than the
third-party beneficiary.
For these reasons, any oral contract to sell or devise land estab-
lished by clear and convincing proof should be specifically enforced
in Kentucky if necesary to prevent perpetration of fraud.
Whayne C. Priest, Jr.
154 E.g., Head v. Schwartz' Ex'r, 304 Ky. 798, 802, 202 S.W.2d 623, 625
(1947), which stated, as an indication of a basis for the court's attitude:
This statute was passed in England in 1676, and it soon found its way
to America. In spite of its age, it has never fully soaked into the
consciousness of all men, and we find every day where men have made
contracts that are within the statute of frauds without reducing them
to writing....
155 See Part H, C, 3 on pages 236-40.
'56 Supra notes 137-39 and related text.
157 See Part H, C, 2 on pages 234-36.
58ee supra note 68 and related text.
159 Besides serving as a basis for the Waters and Skinner rules and the grant-
ing of equitable liens, supra notes 85, 130 and 136 respectively, the doctrine of
equitable fraud is used to retain Kentucky in the small minority which allow a
realty broker to collect his commission on a quantum meruit basis even though
these commission contracts are now specifically within the Statute of Frauds.
KIS 371.010(8); Clinkenbeard v. Poole, 266 S.W.2d 796 (Ky. 1954); 46 Ky.
L.J. 278 (1957).
